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ABSTRACT 
The home Internet user faces a hostile environment abundant in potential attacks on their computers. These attacks 
have been increasing at an alarming rate and cause damage to individuals and organizations regularly, and have 
the potential to cripple the critical infrastructures of entire countries. Recent research has determined that some 
individuals are not utilizing additional software protections available to mitigate these potential security risks. This 
paper seeks to clarify the reasons by proposing a conceptual framework that utilizes the Health Belief Model as a 
possible way to explain why some people do not perceive a threat sufficient to prompt the adoption of computer 
security software. 
Keywords: computer security, technology adoption, home computer security, health belief model and protective 
technology  
INTRODUCTION 
This paper uses the Security Adoption Behavior Model (SABM) presented in [4] to assess home computer security 
adoption by students at a medium sized public university in Washington. There are striking similarities in the beliefs 
and perceptions in protecting one’s health and in protecting one’s computer from infection and attack. The SABM 
uses constructs from the long standing medical Health Belief Model presented in [10]. The objective of the current 
work is to better understand why individuals do (or do not) adopt better security behaviors and ultimately to 
understand how to increase their motivation to do so. 
Research [1, 6] has consistently found that some people do not use available software to reduce their security risk. 
The phenomenal growth of the Internet has brought new and exciting opportunities to the home computer user. 
Online shopping and banking, communication with friends and relatives, access to sources of information for 
research and homework, entertainment sources, up-to-the-minute weather and news, and countless other possible 
online activities have made the internet indispensible for most online-enabled households. However, while providing 
these new opportunities for home Internet users, it has also provided an opportunity-rich environment for criminals 
and others with malicious intent. They seek to exploit computer users who do not adequately protect themselves 
from the ever-increasing number of cyber threats. Using computer security solutions available in the form of anti-
virus, anti-spyware, and firewall software in addition to ensuring that operating systems are properly updated 
provides effective protection from these online threats.  
The U.S. Census Bureau statistics for 2010 population survey show over 119.5 million households in the United 
States with Internet access [12]; all of these are potential targets for Internet-borne attacks. Consumer Reports 
surveyed home users in 2012 and extrapolating from their data estimate 58.2 million online users suffered a 
noticeable malware infection [6]. 
America Online and the National Cyber Security Alliance conducted a survey of Internet users in the United States 
in order to assess their level of security awareness and good practice [1]. The study revealed that approximately 75% 
of all respondents feel that their computer is very safe from online attacks and viruses. Thus, 84% of respondents 
keep sensitive information on their computer and 72% use their computers for sensitive transactions. An 
examination of the respondents’ systems revealed that 15% had no anti-virus software installed and that 67% were 
not updated within the previous week, 19% of these computers had an active viral infection, and that 63% had 
experienced a previous viral infection. The study discovered that 67% of computers had no firewall software 
installed, and 72% with firewalls installed were not properly configured. Inadequately protected computers 
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represented by these recent studies equate to millions of vulnerable computers in the United States that are potential 
victims. With the possibility of infected machines being used to disrupt or destroy critical infrastructures and disrupt 
vital services, the necessity of determining the factors involved in the adoption of computer security solutions 
continues to be important.  
	  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The behavioral antecedents of adoption and use of computer security solutions of home computer users is the focus 
of this research. The concept of perceived vulnerability in online activities seems an appropriate aspect to examine 
when trying to understand adoption and usage behavior for computer security solutions. Additionally, the severity of 
a security incident to the user would also be an important user perception to examine in an effort to better 
understand adoption behavior. Focusing this research on the individual home computer user will contribute to a 
better understanding of computer security adoption behavior.  
 
The current predominant models in information systems used to examine user adoption and usage behavior are the 
Theory of Reasoned Action [8], the Theory of Planned Behavior [2], the Technology Acceptance Model [7], the 
Unified Theory of Acceptance and Usage of Technology [13], the Model of Adoption of Technology in Households 
[3], the Model of PC utilization [11], and the Innovation Diffusion Theory [9].  However, these MIS research 
models usually focus on technologies that promote positive outcomes and offer the user some sort of utility. 
However, computer security software is classified as a protective technology, which is strictly designed to avert 
negative outcomes and offers little obvious utility [5]. 
 
In an attempt to resolve the deficiency of MIS models for security adoption, a research model was constructed to 
examine the effectiveness of the constructs found in the Health Belief Model [10], a healthcare model from outside 
the information systems domain [4].  
 
MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
 
This work uses constructs and the survey instrument developed for the Security Adoption Behavior Model (SABM) 
[4] to explore the behaviors of home computer users in relation to the security measures taken on their computers 
using the research model shown in Figure 1. The slightly simplified conceptual model for the current work contains 
six core constructs that comprise Model 1 in the data analysis and results section below. The analysis also includes 
the interactions of the first five core constructs using prior experience with malware incidents as a moderator 
variable as Model 2. [4] assessed the overall quality of the model and found that it explained 30.4% of the variance 
in the home usage of computer security (adjusted R2 was 0.167). For the current study, we used the factor analysis 
weighting of the survey instrument questions developed in [4] to measure each of these core constructs. This 
replication casts additional light on the complex issue of what induces individual users to mitigate risk of suffering a 
malware incident. 
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Figure 1. Research Model 
 
Research Model Core Constructs 
 
Brief explanations of the core and moderating constructs are presented with their associated research hypotheses. 
Tables 1 and 2 show the mapping of the survey instrument questions to each of the core constructs. Factor analysis 
weights were determined and validated in [4]. 
H1	  –	  Perceived	  Vulnerability	  to	  security	  incidents	  is	  positively	  related	  to	  computer	  security	  usage.	  Perceived	  
Vulnerability	  (VUL)	  is	  an	  individual’s	  judgment	  of	  the	  security	  risk	  of	  his	  or	  her	  computer	  suffering	  from	  a	  particular	  
security	  related	  issue.	  
H2	  –	  Perceived	  severity	  of	  security	  incidents	  is	  positively	  related	  to	  computer	  security	  usage.	  Perceived	  Severity	  
(SEV)	  is	  the	  individual’s	  belief	  in	  the	  severity	  of	  the	  security	  compromise	  and	  its	  impact	  on	  lifestyle.	  	  
H3	  –	  Perceived	  benefits	  of	  practicing	  computer	  security	  are	  positively	  related	  to	  computer	  security	  usage.	  
Perceived	  Benefits	  (BEN)	  of	  an	  action	  is	  the	  belief	  in	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  actions	  required	  to	  prevent	  a	  security	  
risk	  	  
H4	  -­‐	  Perceived	  barriers	  of	  practicing	  computer	  security	  are	  negatively	  related	  to	  computer	  security	  usage.	  
Perceived	  Barriers	  to	  Action	  (BAR)	  construct	  is	  the	  individual’s	  belief	  in	  the	  benefits	  compared	  to	  the	  perceived	  
costs	  of	  action.	  Perceived	  Barriers	  constitute	  obstacles	  to	  adoption	  and	  usage	  of	  security	  software	  for	  home	  
computers.	  	  
H5	  –	  Information	  Security	  Self-­‐efficacy	  is	  positively	  related	  to	  computer	  security	  usage.	  Self-­‐Efficacy	  (SEF)	  is	  an	  
individual’s	  belief	  in	  his	  or	  her	  own	  ability	  to	  carry	  out	  a	  particular	  task.	  For	  this	  study,	  it	  means	  the	  belief	  that	  the	  
individual	  can	  install,	  configure,	  and	  maintain	  the	  security	  software	  on	  their	  computer.	  	  
H6	  -­‐	  Cues	  to	  action	  are	  positively	  related	  to	  computer	  security	  usage.	  Cues	  to	  Action	  (CUE):	  Even	  if	  a	  person	  is	  
motivated	  and	  can	  perceive	  a	  beneficial	  action	  to	  take,	  actual	  change	  often	  occurs	  only	  in	  response	  to	  some	  
external	  or	  internal	  cue.	  	  
Research Model Moderating Variable 
Prior Experience (PXP)  
H7a-­‐e	  -­‐	  Prior	  Experience	  (with	  security	  issues	  or	  attacks)	  significantly	  moderates	  the	  relationships	  of	  VUL,	  SEV,	  
BEN,	  BAR	  and	  SEF	  on	  Computer	  Security	  Usage	  (CSU).	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Research Model Dependent Variable 
Computer Security Usage (CSU) 
This is the dependent variable of the study as depicted in Figure 1. The measurement for this construct is self-
reported usage of computer security software. It is assessed using questions to determine if the individual has anti-
virus, firewall, and anti-spyware software installed and the level of usage. Software updates are not addressed in this 
study. 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Survey Design 
This research used an Internet-based survey to test the proposed model. The survey used questions developed and 
presented in [4]. The population of interest is all Internet enabled computer owners that are at least partially 
responsible for the selection, installation, and maintenance of the software on their computers.  
Perceived Vulnerability, Perceived Severity, and Perceived Benefits used the scenario based items listed in Table 1. 
The questions for the remaining model constructs are listed in Table 2. All questions used a seven point scale. 
 
Table 1 Security Incident Scenarios and Core Construct Associations 
Scenario Question (evaluated for likeliness, severity, and benefits) Construct and 
Measure 
1 My computer system becoming corrupted by a virus or worm.  VUL1-8: Highly Likely 
to Highly Un-Likely for 
vulnerability 
SEV1-8: Very important 
to not at all important 
for severity 
BEN1-8: Highly useful 
to not at all useful for 
benefits of using 
security software 
2 My computer system being taken over by a hacker. 
3 My data corrupted by a virus or cyber-attack. 
4 My identity stolen (credit card number, Social Security Number, Bank 
account information, etc.). 
5 My data lost due to a virus or worm on my computer. 
6 The Internet becoming inaccessible because of computer security 
problems. 
7 Downloading a file that is infected with a virus through my e-mail. 
8 Downloading a file that is infected with a virus from the internet. 
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Table 2 Survey Question Items and Core Construct Associations 
Item Question Measure 
BAR1 The expense of security software is a concern for me. Highly Disagree to Highly Agree 
BAR2 Using security software would change the way I use my computer. Highly Disagree to Highly Agree 
BAR3 Using security software effectively is time consuming. Highly Disagree to Highly Agree 
BAR4 Using security software is would require considerable investment of effort other than time. 
Highly Disagree to Highly Agree 
SEF1 I can select the appropriate security software for my home computer. Not At All Confident to Totally 
Confident 
SEF2 I can correctly install security software on my home computer(s). Not At All Confident to Totally 
Confident 
SEF3 I can correctly configure security software on my home computer(s). Not At All Confident to Totally 
Confident 
SEF4 I can find the information I need if I have problems using security 
software on my home computer(s). 
Not At All Confident to Totally 
Confident 
CUE1 If a friend were to tell me of a recent experience with a computer 
virus, I would be more conscious of my computer's chance of being 
attacked. 
Highly Disagree to Highly Agree 
CUE2 If my computer started behaving strangely, I would be concerned it 
had been the victim of a security attack. 
Highly Disagree to Highly Agree 
CUE3 If I saw a news report, or read a newspaper or magazine about a new 
computer vulnerability, I would be more concerned about my 
computer's chances of being attacked. 
Highly Disagree to Highly Agree 
CUE4 If I received an email from the maker of my computer’s operating 
system about a new security vulnerability, I would be more concerned 
about my computer's chances of being attacked. 
Highly Disagree to Highly Agree 
PXP1 How frequently have you been affected by a computer security 
problem? 
Never to All the Time 
PXP2 How recently have you been affected by a computer security 
problem? 
Never to Within the Last Week 
PXP3 The level of impact I have experienced from a computer security 
problem is:  
Very Low/No Impact to Very 
High Impact 
SSU1 I use add-on anti-virus software on my home computer(s). Never to Always 
SSU2 I use add-on firewall software on my home computer(s) Never to Always 
SSU3 I use add-on anti-spyware software on my home computer(s) Never to Always 
 
Data Collection 
To recruit participants for the study members of undergraduate classes at a northwestern United States university 
were asked to complete the survey on SurveyMonkey.com. This website allows the survey to be filled out 
anonymously. Data collection yielded 99 usable surveys. Table 3 lists the sample participant characteristics. 
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Table 3: Sample Characteristics 
Categorical Variable Frequency Percent (%) 
Gender (GEN)   
Male 52 52.5 
Female 45 45.4 
No Answer 2 2.0 
   
Operating System (OS)   
Windows XP or Earlier 2 2.0 
Windows Vista 4 4.0 
Windows 7 63 63.6 
Windows 8 14 14.1 
Apple OS X 14 14.1 
Linux 2 2.0 
   
Continuous Variable Value  
AGE   
Mean 33.68  
Standard Deviation 11.75  
 
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
To test the hypotheses outlined above, a multiple regression analysis was conducted using SPSS with all non-
dichotomous variables mean-centered prior to the regression analysis. The descriptive statistics for the variables 
used in the regression can be found in Table 4.  The regression employed a hierarchical two-step method. In the first 
step (Model 1), the dependent variable Computer Security Usage was regressed on the six independent variables to 
determine main effects. The moderating variable: prior experience; and the hypothesized two-way interactions 
between it and the five independent variables comprised step two (Model 2). Regression results appear in Table 5. 
This study supports the understanding that several individual human characteristics help explain individual adoption 
of security behavior and that there is still considerable room for improving this understanding and corresponding 
behavior. 
Table 4 Construct Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Min Max Mean St. Dev. Skew St. Err. Kurtosis St. Err. 
Vulnerability 1.000 7.000 3.859 1.546 -0.011 0.243 -1.061 0.481 
Severity 1.000 7.000 5.597 1.232 -1.254 0.243 1.881 0.481 
Benefits 1.000 7.000 4.835 1.237 -0.897 0.243 0.956 0.481 
Barriers 1.000 6.750 3.436 1.380 -0.057 0.243 -0.903 0.481 
Cues to Action 1.000 7.000 5.000 1.086 -0.832 0.243 -1.358 0.481 
Self Efficacy 1.500 7.000 5.760 1.329 -1.137 0.243 0.633 0.481 
Prior Experience 1.000 5.000 2.394 0.907 0.272 0.243 -0.519 0.481 
Computer Security Usage 1.000 7.000 5.027 2.066 -0.774 0.243 -0.603 0.481 
 
In the current study, overall, the research model explains 35.3% of the variance in the dependent variable, computer 
security usage; slightly more than the 30.4% of the variance explained by the model as used in the prior study [4]. 
The main effects of vulnerability, severity, benefits, barriers, self-efficacy, and cues to action account for 26.2% of 
the explained variance, while the moderating variable, prior experience and the hypothesized two-way effects 
account for 9.1% of the variance in computer security usage.  
In the Model 1 regression analysis, the core construct main effects of vulnerability, severity, benefits, barriers, self-
efficacy, and cues to action, were tested (H1-H6). In model 2, the research hypotheses H7a-e were tested to 
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determine the strength of the interaction effects of the moderating variable. In Table 5 the post-hoc t- test the 
number of asterisks next to each un-standardized coefficient indicates significance level for each model component. 
Table 5: Regression Results 
 
 
Model 1 
In Model 1, the research hypotheses H1 through H6 were tested to determine the main effects of the Independent 
variables on the dependent variables. Results from the Model 1 analysis are listed in Table 5. Only two hypotheses 
were supported:  H1 (vulnerability) and H5(self-efficacy) had significant coefficients as expected. Interestingly, the 
severity coefficient was significant but contrary to the hypothesis had a negative sign. This inconsistency may 
appear because a significant number of participants have a faulty or unrealistic perception of severity.  
Model 2 
 
The second model focused on research hypotheses H7a-e: that prior experience would have a significant moderating 
effect on the core constructs. As shown in Table 6, two hypotheses were supported: H7b and H7c.  H7b with a 
coefficient showing significant moderating effect as hypothesized. Prior experience did interact with perceived 
benefits to produce a significant coefficient; however, unlike results in [4], it produced a negative coefficient. Please 
see the prior experience - perceived benefits interaction discussion that follows Figure 3 for a discussion of this 
results. 
 
 
 Model 1 
Coefficients 
Model 2 
Coefficients 
Result 
Vulnerability (VUL) 0.364** 0.297* H1 Supported 
Severity (SEV) -0.364* -0.315 H2 Not supported 
Benefits (BEN) 0.273 0.264 H3 Not supported 
Barriers (BAR) -0.267 -0.315* H4 Not supported 
Self-Efficacy (SEF) 0.425** 0.372* H5 Supported 
Cues to Action (CUE) 0.351 0.254 H6 Not supported 
    
Prior Experience (PXP)  0.089  
PXP * VUL  -0.110 H7a Not supported 
PXP * SEV  0.454* H7b Supported 
PXP * BEN  -0.432* H7c Supported 
PXP * BAR  -0.040 H7d Not supported 
PXP * SEF  0.221 H7e Not supported 
    
 Model 1 Model 2  
R2 0.262*** 0.353***  
Adjusted R2 0.214 0.263  
Change in R2  0.091  
*p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001 
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Figure 2. Interaction of Prior Experience and Perceived Severity 
The interaction of prior experience and severity on computer security usage, Figure 2, shows that when prior 
experience with security incidents is high (+2 SD), perceived severity has a positive relationship with computer 
security usage. This is consistent with the hypothesis that perceived severity is positively related to computer 
security usage. However, when prior experience is low (-2 SD), the simple slope of the line takes on a negative 
value and the corresponding value of computer security decreases. This inconsistency may appear because 
participants with little prior experience have a faulty or very skewed perception of severity.  
 
 
Figure 3. Interaction of Prior Experience and Perceived Benefits 
The interaction of prior experience and perceived benefits on computer security usage, Figure 3, shows that when 
prior experience with security incidents is low (-2 SD), Perceived Benefits has a positive relationship with computer 
security usage. This is consistent with the hypothesis that perceived benefits is positively related to computer 
security usage. When prior experience is high (+2 SD) the relationship between Perceived Benefits and Computer 
Security Usage is slightly negative. This inconsistency may appear because participants with extensive prior 
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malware events recognize that some problems can occur regardless of how diligently one behaves to mitigate risk. 
Another possible interpretation may be that students with prior malware experiences believe that mitigating security 
risks is not worth the expected benefit. 
Respondents with low prior experience had a much more widely distributed range of perceived benefits and 
computer security usage. Those with high prior experience had a narrow range of computer security usage with a 
slightly negative slope to their perceived benefits. This unexpected distribution seems to be the key reason for the 
negative coefficient for this interaction.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The research model shown in Figure 1 presents 11 constructs and moderated interactions as predictors for computer 
security usage behavior in the home environment. This study provides empirical evidence that these constructs 
contribute to this understudied area of computer security. The results of this research also suggest that further 
evaluation of models based on the Health Belief Model may enhance the understanding of computer security 
adoption in the home.  
Two of the constructs in the research model, perceived severity and cues to action, do not appear in other extant 
Information Systems models. While cues to action was not found to be a significant predictors of computer security 
usage in this research, it may still offer possible explanations of attitude that should be explored in the future.  
The testing of the model with the current sample data revealed significant contributors to the usage of computer 
security were the perceived vulnerability of a security incident, perceived severity of security incidents and the 
moderating effect of prior experience with a security incident on perceived severity and perceived benefits of secure 
practices.  
Implications for educators 
The results presented above suggest that user education could influence users’ perceptions of vulnerability and 
improve security software usage. 
Limitations 
One major limitation of this study is the non-random, college student-based sample used. The full population of 
interest (potentially all home computer users) is large and heterogeneous. The anonymous nature of the data 
collection and the sampling method lead to the possibility of non-responder bias which is impossible to measure in 
this study. 
Another limitation is that the study used self-reported usage as a dependent variable. This could result in a self-
report bias in which the respondents answer the usage measures in a way that would make their usage appear higher 
than would be measured through observation or experimentation. The results presented in [1] suggest that some 
home users hold unrealistic or inaccurate views of the vulnerability and level of risk mitigation on their home 
computers. 
 
The use of an online survey limits the respondent pool to those that felt comfortable completing the survey, creating 
a potential response bias.  
Future Research 
An obvious addition to this study would be a replication using different samples from the target population, such as 
international samples. Another option would be to combine the most significant constructs from this model with 
those from another effective tool such as the Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology (UTAUT) 
described in [13]. 
Issues in Information Systems 
Volume 14, Issue 2, pp.139-148, 2013 
 
	   	   	   	  	  	  	  148	  
This study considered computer security usage as the application of anti-virus, firewall, and anti-spyware software. 
Future applications of the model could be extended to the behaviors involved in opening suspicious emails, using 
suspicious websites, file sharing, and other high-risk online activities.  
Finally, the application of the HBM to the study of security adoption can be extended beyond the home environment 
to study security adoption behavior in the corporate environment.  
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